Learning Objectives
By the end of this lesson, students will be able to:
- Compare the different forms of political power that took shape in Europe between 1648 and 1815, distinguishing absolutist and constitutionalist regimes (LO H; Skill 6.B; KC-2.1).
- Compare the post-Westphalian state-sovereignty principle and the eighteenth-century balance-of-power system as common features that operated across both absolutist and constitutionalist regimes (KC-1.5, KC-1.5.I).
- Compare the absolutist treatment of the nobility (limited political role, preserved social standing) with the constitutionalist treatment (greater political role through assemblies and parliaments) (KC-2.1.I, KC-2.1.II).
- Compare the long-run trajectories of the principal regimes by 1815: France's revolutionary collapse, England's continued constitutional development, the Dutch Republic's commercial decline, Hohenzollern Prussia's military durability, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's elimination through partition.
- Use Skill 6.B (Argumentation: back an argument with relevant, specific evidence) to defend a comparative thesis on the dimensions, similarities, and differences between absolutist and constitutionalist regimes between 1648 and 1815.
Key Concepts
Unit 3 has traced the post-Westphalia European state-building project across the long eighteenth century. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia ratified state sovereignty (KC-1.5.I) as the organizing principle of European international relations and ended religious war as the principal cause of European interstate conflict (KC-1.5.II.A). The next century and a half tested how European states should exercise that sovereignty, and two principal forms emerged. Topic 3.8 closes the unit by comparing these forms across multiple dimensions and by asking students to defend a comparative thesis with specific evidence from across Unit 3.
The absolutist form is captured by KC-2.1.I: across much of Europe, absolute monarchy consolidated over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The principal cases are four. Bourbon France under Louis XIV and his finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert is the canonical example: KC-2.1.I.B captures the program of administrative, financial, military, and religious centralization, and KC-2.1.I.A captures the social bargain by which the nobility surrendered political independence in exchange for preserved social standing and legal privileges (Topic 3.7). Hohenzollern Brandenburg-Prussia built its absolutist trajectory on the alliance between the crown and the Junker noble landlord class. Habsburg Austria consolidated its multi-territorial domains through Leopold I, Maria Theresa, and Joseph II's enlightened reforms. Romanov Russia took the most dramatic path: KC-2.1.I.E captures Peter the Great's westernization of Russian political, religious, and cultural institutions and Catherine the Great's continuation of the project (Topic 3.7).
The constitutionalist form is captured by KC-2.1.II: challenges to absolutism produced alternative political systems. Three principal cases. KC-2.1.II.A captures the English path: the Civil War (1642-1651) and Glorious Revolution (1688) defended the rights of the gentry and aristocracy against absolutism through assertions of the rights of Parliament, ratified by the 1689 Bill of Rights and the 1701 Act of Settlement (Topic 3.2). KC-2.1.II.B captures the Dutch path: the Dutch Republic, founded by a Protestant revolt against Habsburg rule, developed an oligarchy of urban merchants and rural landholders that promoted trade and protected traditional rights (Topic 3.5). KC-2.1.I.D captures the Polish counterexample: Poland's monarchy could not consolidate authority over its nobility, and Prussia, Russia, and Austria partitioned Poland in the late eighteenth century, removing it from the European map (Topic 3.6).
What did the two forms have in common? Both operated under post-Westphalian state sovereignty (KC-1.5.I) and within the eighteenth-century balance-of-power system. Both pursued mercantilist economic policy and overseas commercial empires (KC-2.2.II: the European-dominated worldwide economic network drove the agricultural, industrial, and consumer revolutions in Europe). Both built standing armies, professional bureaucracies, and the heavier taxation systems the eighteenth-century military revolution required (Topic 3.6's KC-1.5.II.B). Both faced challenges from nobles defending traditional governance (KC-1.5.III.B) and from minority regional and language groups (KC-1.5.III.C). Both participated in the long eighteenth-century commercial revolution that produced the Agricultural Revolution, the putting-out system, and new financial institutions such as the Bank of England (KC-2.2.I, Topic 3.3).
Where did the two forms diverge? Several specific dimensions. Monarch-noble relations: absolutist regimes used royal court culture (Versailles, Saint Petersburg) to integrate nobles into ceremonial dependence on the crown; constitutionalist regimes preserved noble political authority through parliaments (England) or oligarchical councils (Dutch Republic). Representative institutions: absolutist regimes either reduced or never developed national representative assemblies (the French Estates-General did not meet between 1614 and 1789); constitutionalist regimes built their politics around them (the English Parliament after 1689; the Dutch States General). Religious settlement: absolutist regimes typically pursued state-allied or state-controlled churches (the Gallican Church under Louis XIV; the Russian Orthodox Holy Synod under Peter the Great; the suppression of Huguenot toleration in 1685); constitutionalist regimes typically extended religious toleration earlier (the English Toleration Act of 1689 for Protestant Dissenters; Dutch tolerance of Sephardi Jewish, Huguenot, and other refugees). Public finance: constitutionalist regimes developed funded public debt mechanisms (the Bank of England, 1694) that gave them sustained access to cheap credit; absolutist regimes relied more heavily on royal taxation that often hit ceilings during prolonged warfare.
The long-run trajectories by 1815 were becoming visible. Bourbon France's centralized absolutism produced extraordinary state capacity in the seventeenth century but proved structurally vulnerable in the late eighteenth: the financial strain of Louis XIV's wars and the inability of Louis XV and Louis XVI to reform the fiscal system led to the 1789 French Revolution that Unit 5 covers in detail. England's constitutional settlement after 1688 produced sustained political stability, low-cost public credit, and the institutional foundation of late-eighteenth-century British industrial leadership; the political form survived the Napoleonic Wars largely intact. The Dutch Republic's commercial primacy declined across the eighteenth century as English and French commercial competition increased, but its constitutional and cultural legacy endured into the modern Netherlands. Hohenzollern Prussia's military-administrative state survived the Napoleonic invasion (1806-1807 catastrophe at Jena-Auerstadt notwithstanding) and emerged as the engine of nineteenth-century German unification. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's elimination by partition (1772, 1793, 1795) was the cautionary outlier: an oligarchical constitutional form unable to fund the eighteenth-century military revolution was absorbed by its better-armed neighbors.
The deeper question Topic 3.8 puts to students is whether the absolutist or constitutionalist path produced the more durable political form. The answer is partial and contingent. By 1815, England's constitutional settlement looked impressively stable; Bourbon absolutism had collapsed in revolution; Hohenzollern absolutism had survived; the Dutch and Polish constitutional alternatives had ended (the Dutch under Napoleonic conquest in 1795-1813; the Polish through partition). The Enlightenment of Unit 4 and the late-eighteenth-century revolutions of Unit 5 will test the question further. Students who can defend a comparative thesis backed by specific evidence drawn from Topics 3.1 through 3.7 — Skill 6.B's central task — have the framework AP Euro Unit 3 expects.
Primary Source Excerpts
Three sources framing the Unit 3 comparison: Locke's classical statement of the constitutionalist case, Bossuet's classical statement of the absolutist case, and Montesquieu's mid-eighteenth-century comparative analysis of European political forms.
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 1689
John Locke (1632-1704) wrote the Two Treatises of Government across the 1680s and published them anonymously in 1689 to justify the Glorious Revolution. The Second Treatise argued that legitimate political authority rests on the consent of the governed, that government's purpose is to protect natural rights to life, liberty, and property, and that subjects retain a right of revolution when government violates the trust the people have placed in it. Locke's argument provided the theoretical framework for both the English settlement of 1689 and (later) the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French revolutionary documents of 1789. For Topic 3.8 the source is the canonical statement of the constitutionalist case: political authority is conditional, limited, and accountable. The source pairs directly with Bossuet's contemporary defense of divine-right absolutism.
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), bk. 2, ch. 8. Project Gutenberg edition, 2005. View at Project Gutenberg →Bishop Jacques-Benigne Bossuet, Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture, 1709
Bishop Jacques-Benigne Bossuet's Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture (composed in the 1670s as instruction for the dauphin, Louis XIV's heir, and published posthumously in 1709) was the canonical theoretical defense of divine-right absolutism. Royal authority comes directly from God; the monarch is accountable to God alone; no human institution has legitimate constitutional authority to constrain the king. For Topic 3.8 the source is the absolutist counterpart to Locke. Read together, the two excerpts state the principal philosophical contrast that Unit 3 traces: a political order grounded in divine appointment versus a political order grounded in popular consent. The contrast is not merely theoretical; it shaped the actual political institutions of the eighteenth-century European states that adopted each.
Jacques-Benigne Bossuet, Politique tiree des propres paroles de l'Ecriture Sainte, ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), bks. 3-4. Internet History Sourcebooks (Fordham University). View at Internet History Sourcebooks →Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), published De l'Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws) in 1748 after roughly twenty years of work. The treatise was the most influential mid-eighteenth-century European comparative analysis of political forms. Montesquieu's three-fold classification (republican, monarchical, despotic), his case for separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and his analysis of the relationship between climate, geography, and political form set the framework for late-eighteenth-century constitutional thought. American constitutional drafters in 1787 and French revolutionary drafters in 1789-1791 drew heavily on Montesquieu's framework. For Topic 3.8 the source documents how Enlightenment Europeans themselves understood the comparison Unit 3 traces: between monarchical regimes operating under fixed law (constitutionalist) and despotic regimes operating by royal caprice (the line Montesquieu drew, controversially, around the most centralized absolutist regimes).
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914), bk. 2 ch. 1, bk. 11 ch. 6. Project Gutenberg edition, 2003. View at Project Gutenberg →Discussion Questions
- (Comparison) Compare the absolutist and constitutionalist forms of European political power between 1648 and 1815 along three specific dimensions: monarch-noble relations, role of representative institutions, and religious settlement. Cite specific examples for each dimension.
- (Comparison) Compare what the absolutist and constitutionalist regimes had in common: post-Westphalian sovereignty, mercantilist economic policy, balance-of-power diplomacy, the resource demands of the military revolution. What does this shared framework tell us about the underlying European state system?
- (Comparison, Skill 6.B) Compare Locke's Second Treatise, Bossuet's Politics from Scripture, and Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws. What thesis about the relationship between government and liberty does each defend, and what specific evidence does each invoke?
- (Comparison) Compare the long-run trajectories of three Unit 3 regimes by 1815: Bourbon France, England after 1688, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. What conditions produced revolutionary collapse in one, sustained constitutional development in another, and elimination through partition in the third?
- (Comparison) Compare absolutist and constitutionalist regimes' performance under the eighteenth-century military revolution. Why did the constitutional English path produce stronger fiscal capacity (through funded public debt) than the absolutist French path that depended on heavier royal taxation?
Classroom Activities
Unit 3 Comparison Matrix
On the board, draw a six-column matrix labeling Bourbon France, Hohenzollern Brandenburg-Prussia, Habsburg Austria, Romanov Russia, England after 1688, and the Dutch Republic. In small groups, students fill in five rows for each: (a) form (absolutist or constitutionalist), (b) source of legitimate authority, (c) representative institutions, (d) religious settlement, (e) signature monarch or political figure. Skill 6.B practice: groups draft a one-paragraph comparative thesis backed by three specific pieces of evidence drawn from the matrix.
Locke vs Bossuet Side-by-Side
Distribute the Locke and Bossuet excerpts. In pairs, students identify (a) Locke's claim about the basis of legitimate political authority (consent of the governed), (b) Bossuet's claim about the basis of legitimate political authority (divine appointment), (c) Locke's view of the right of revolution, (d) Bossuet's view of accountability for royal acts (none to subjects). Pairs draft a comparative paragraph and identify which subsequent eighteenth-century European political institutions reflected each writer's framework.
Five Long-Run Trajectories
On the board, draw five timelines from 1648 to 1815 representing Bourbon France, England, the Dutch Republic, Hohenzollern Prussia, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In small groups, students mark four key dates on each timeline (e.g., for England: 1660 Restoration, 1688 Glorious Revolution, 1707 Act of Union with Scotland, 1763 Treaty of Paris). Groups account for the divergent long-run trajectories and identify which structural features produced each outcome.
DBQ Thesis Workshop (Skill 6.B)
On the board, write the prompt: “Compare the different forms of political power that took shape in Europe between 1648 and 1815.” In pairs, students draft a thesis statement that takes a clear comparative position (absolutist regimes were more X than constitutionalist regimes; or constitutionalist regimes were more X than absolutist regimes) and a brief outline of three pieces of specific evidence backing the thesis. The activity practices Skill 6.B: argumentation backed by relevant, specific evidence drawn from across Unit 3.
Vocabulary
Standards Alignment
Draft alignment — pending educator review. AP European History codes correspond to the official College Board Course and Exam Description (Effective Fall 2023, V.1). Statements below are paraphrased in the CountryReports voice; refer to the College Board's published CED for verbatim wording.
Thematic Focus (Synthesis)
Historical Thinking Skill and Reasoning Process
Learning Objective
Key Concepts (Review)
AP Practice Questions
- (A) Absolutist regimes pursued mercantilist economic policy while constitutionalist regimes practiced free trade.
- (B) Absolutist regimes consolidated supreme legal authority in the monarch and limited noble political participation, while constitutionalist regimes placed legal limits on royal authority through assemblies or oligarchical councils (KC-2.1.I, KC-2.1.II).
- (C) Absolutist regimes were Catholic while constitutionalist regimes were exclusively Protestant.
- (D) Absolutist regimes were located in eastern Europe while constitutionalist regimes were located in western Europe.
- (E) Absolutist regimes had no standing armies while constitutionalist regimes had the largest professional militaries.
Correct: (B). KC-2.1.I and KC-2.1.II together capture the core contrast: absolutist consolidation of supreme legal authority versus constitutionalist legal limits on royal authority. Choice (A) misstates: both forms pursued mercantilist policy through the eighteenth century. (C) misstates: Bourbon France and Habsburg Austria were Catholic absolutist regimes, but Hohenzollern Brandenburg-Prussia was Protestant absolutist; the Dutch Republic was Protestant constitutionalist while the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was Catholic constitutionalist. (D) reverses the geography: Bourbon France was a western absolutist state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was an eastern constitutionalist state. (E) inverts: absolutist regimes typically built the largest standing armies (Louis XIV's 400,000 troops; Frederick the Great's 200,000). (LO H; Skill 6.B; Reasoning Process: Comparison).
- Identify ONE specific way in which absolutist and constitutionalist regimes shared a common feature (such as state sovereignty, mercantilism, or balance-of-power diplomacy).
- Explain ONE specific dimension along which absolutist and constitutionalist regimes diverged (such as monarch-noble relations, role of representative institutions, or religious settlement).
- Explain ONE specific long-run outcome by 1815 of EITHER an absolutist OR a constitutionalist regime (Bourbon revolutionary collapse, English constitutional durability, Dutch commercial decline, Hohenzollern military survival, Polish elimination through partition).
Scoring: 1 point for each part. Strong responses to part (a) might cite the post-Westphalian state-sovereignty principle (KC-1.5.I); mercantilist economic policy (KC-2.2.II.A); the balance-of-power coalition system (KC-1.5.II.A); the eighteenth-century military revolution's resource demands (KC-1.5.II.B); the long eighteenth-century commercial revolution (KC-2.2.I); or the European-dominated overseas commercial network (KC-2.2.II). Part (b) responses might cite Bourbon Versailles court culture versus English parliamentary politics; the absence of national representative assemblies in absolutist regimes versus parliaments in England and the States General in the Dutch Republic; the Gallican Church and Russian Holy Synod versus the English Toleration Act and Dutch religious tolerance; or absolutist royal taxation versus the Bank of England's funded public debt (KC-2.1.I, KC-2.1.II). Part (c) responses might cite the 1789 French Revolution as the collapse of Bourbon absolutism; the post-1689 stability of the English constitutional settlement; the eighteenth-century decline of Dutch commercial primacy; the Hohenzollern Prussian military-administrative state's survival of the Napoleonic invasion; or the 1772-1795 partitions eliminating Poland-Lithuania.
The full seven-document set for this DBQ lives in the Unit 3 practice exam packet (Document A: Bossuet, Politics from Scripture, 1709; Document B: English Bill of Rights, 1689; Document C: Locke, Second Treatise, 1689; Document D: Act of Abjuration, 1581; Document E: Frederick the Great, History of My Own Times, c. 1745; Document F: Catherine the Great, Nakaz, 1767; Document G: Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 1748).
Scoring framework: 1 point thesis, 1 point contextualization, up to 4 points evidence (at least 3 documents used to support the argument, plus an outside-evidence point), 1 point sourcing (point of view, purpose, situation, audience for at least three documents), 1 point complexity. Maximum 7 points. The default reasoning process is Comparison; strong responses identify the principal absolutist-constitutionalist contrast and integrate at least one shared feature across the two forms (state sovereignty, mercantilism, balance-of-power diplomacy). Acknowledging variation within each form (Bourbon France's revolutionary collapse versus Hohenzollern Prussia's durability; the Dutch Republic's commercial decline versus England's constitutional success) earns the complexity point.
Scoring framework: 1 point thesis, 1 point contextualization, 2 points evidence (at least two pieces of specific historical evidence, one of which directly supports the argument), 1 point analysis using the Comparison reasoning process, 1 point complexity. Maximum 6 points. The complexity point is most often earned by integrating the comparison along multiple dimensions (monarch-noble relations, representative institutions, religious settlement, fiscal-military structure) and acknowledging that the absolutist-constitutionalist contrast was real but operated within a shared post-Westphalian framework of state sovereignty, mercantilist policy, and balance-of-power diplomacy. Strong responses also address the long-run trajectories: by 1815 the constitutional English settlement was producing institutional stability and industrial leadership while Bourbon absolutism had collapsed in revolution — a comparison that frames Unit 5's late-eighteenth-century revolutions and Unit 6's nineteenth-century industrialization.

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