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AP Euro Unit 7 · Lesson 3 of 9CED Topic 7.3Skill 2.C: Sourcing and SituationReasoning: Causation~ 50 min

National Unification and Diplomatic Tensions

Between 1859 and 1871, the European political map was transformed. The Crimean War (1853-1856) had weakened the Concert of Europe; in its aftermath, Cavour's Piedmontese diplomacy and Garibaldi's military campaigns produced a unified Italy (1859-1870). Bismarck's Realpolitik produced a unified Germany through three wars (1864, 1866, 1870-1871). After 1871, Bismarck managed European peace through a complex alliance system; his 1890 dismissal eventually produced the antagonistic alliance blocks that drew Europe into the First World War.

Learning Objectives

By the end of this lesson, students will be able to:

  • Identify the conditions that produced Italian unification and German unification (Skill 2.C; LO C).
  • Account for how nationalist sentiment and political alliances generated tension among European powers between 1815 and 1914 (LO D).
  • Account for KC-3.4.II.A: how the Crimean War exposed the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and contributed to the breakdown of the Concert of Europe.
  • Account for KC-3.4.III.A: how Cavour's diplomacy combined with Garibaldi's military campaigns to produce Italian unification.
  • Account for KC-3.4.III.B: how Bismarck used Realpolitik to unify Germany through three wars.
  • Account for KC-3.4.III.C, KC-3.4.III.D, and KC-3.4.III.E: how the post-1871 alliance system operated, how it broke down after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, and how Balkan nationalist tensions drew the great powers into the First World War.

Key Concepts

Topic 7.3 traces the central political transformation of late-nineteenth-century Europe: the unification of Italy and Germany, and the diplomatic order that emerged after 1871. The unifications reshaped the European balance of power decisively. The post-1871 Bismarckian alliance system attempted to manage the new balance through complex diplomacy; its post-1890 breakdown produced the antagonistic alliance blocks that drew Europe into the First World War.

The Crimean War and the breakdown of the Concert. KC-3.4.II.A: the Crimean War demonstrated the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and contributed to the breakdown of the Concert of Europe, thereby creating the conditions in which Italy and Germany could be unified. The war (1853-1856) pitted Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and (from 1855) Piedmont-Sardinia against Russia. The immediate trigger was Russian pressure on the Ottoman Empire over the protection of Orthodox Christians in Palestine; the deeper issue was the long-running "Eastern Question" of how to manage the Ottoman Empire's gradual decline. The war was costly and inconclusive in military terms (the principal battles at Balaclava, Inkerman, and the siege of Sevastopol in 1854-1855) but politically transformative. Russia's defeat ended its post-1815 role as the gendarme of European conservatism. The Treaty of Paris (March 1856) demilitarized the Black Sea and produced the conditions in which Italian and German unification would proceed without effective Russian opposition. Cavour's small Piedmontese contribution to the war (15,000 troops sent to Crimea in 1855) gave Piedmont-Sardinia a seat at the Paris peace conference and the diplomatic standing to pursue Italian unification with French support.

Italian unification. KC-3.4.III.A: Cavour's diplomatic strategies, combined with the popular Garibaldi's military campaigns, produced the unification of Italy. The unification proceeded in three principal phases.

The 1859 war against Austria. Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour (1810-1861), Prime Minister of Piedmont-Sardinia from 1852, met Napoleon III secretly at Plombieres-les-Bains in July 1858 and negotiated a treaty providing for French military assistance against Austria in exchange for Piedmontese cession of Nice and Savoy to France. Cavour engineered an Austrian declaration of war in April 1859. The combined French-Piedmontese forces won the principal battles at Magenta and Solferino in June 1859. The Solferino battlefield was so bloody (Henri Dunant's experience of the aftermath inspired the founding of the International Red Cross in 1863). Napoleon III, alarmed at Prussian mobilization on the Rhine and at the size of his own losses, signed an armistice at Villafranca in July 1859 short of Cavour's full territorial aims. Lombardy was nonetheless transferred to Piedmont-Sardinia. Cavour resigned in protest at Villafranca but returned to office in January 1860.

The 1860 plebiscites and Garibaldi's southern campaign. Plebiscites in Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna in March 1860 produced large majorities for union with Piedmont-Sardinia; the central Italian states formally joined the kingdom. In May 1860, Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) and his thousand red-shirted volunteers (the Mille) sailed from Genoa to Sicily to support a popular revolt against Bourbon-Sicilian rule. Garibaldi's small force defeated the much larger Bourbon army at Calatafimi (15 May), captured Palermo (27 May), crossed to the Italian mainland, and entered Naples on 7 September. Cavour, alarmed by Garibaldi's republican sympathies and by the prospect of an attack on Rome that would provoke French intervention, sent the Piedmontese army through the Papal States to meet Garibaldi at Teano (26 October 1860). Garibaldi handed over his conquests to King Victor Emmanuel II and retired to his farm on Caprera. The Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed at Turin on 17 March 1861.

The completion of unification. Two territories remained outside the new kingdom in 1861: Venetia (under Austrian rule until 1866) and Rome (under Papal rule, defended by a French garrison stationed there since the 1849 suppression of the Roman Republic). Venice was added in 1866 after the Austro-Prussian War: Italy fought as Prussia's ally and received Venetia in the peace settlement despite military defeats at Custoza (24 June 1866) and Lissa (20 July 1866). Rome was added in 1870 after the Franco-Prussian War: the French garrison withdrew in August 1870 to fight the Prussians, and Italian troops entered Rome on 20 September 1870. Pope Pius IX declared himself a "prisoner in the Vatican" and refused to recognize the Italian state until the 1929 Lateran Treaty.

"Cavour's diplomatic strategies, combined with the popular Garibaldi's military campaigns, led to the unification of Italy."AP Euro CED, KC-3.4.III.A (paraphrased)

German unification. KC-3.4.III.B: Bismarck used Realpolitik — diplomacy, industrialized warfare, modern weaponry, and the manipulation of democratic mechanisms — to unify Germany. The unification proceeded through three wars over seven years.

The 1864 Danish War. Otto von Bismarck (Minister-President of Prussia from September 1862, after the "Blood and Iron" speech covered in Topic 7.1) maneuvered Austria into joint Prussian-Austrian intervention against Denmark over the disputed duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Combined Prussian-Austrian forces defeated Denmark in a brief war (February-October 1864). The Treaty of Vienna placed the duchies under joint Austro-Prussian condominium — an arrangement Bismarck used to engineer subsequent conflict with Austria.

The 1866 Austro-Prussian War (Seven Weeks' War). Bismarck provoked Austria into war over the administration of Schleswig and Holstein in June 1866. The Prussian army under Helmuth von Moltke had been reformed and re-equipped (the Dreyse needle gun, more rapid mobilization through the Prussian railway network); the Austrian forces fought capably but were defeated at Koniggratz (Sadowa) on 3 July 1866. Bismarck restrained Wilhelm I and the Prussian generals from imposing harsh terms on Austria, calculating that Austria would be a useful future ally. The Treaty of Prague (August 1866) excluded Austria from German affairs and established the North German Confederation under Prussian leadership. Italy, allied with Prussia, received Venetia. The Habsburg Empire reorganized itself the following year through the Ausgleich (Topic 7.2) into the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

The 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War. The 1868 Spanish revolution had deposed Queen Isabella II; the Spanish throne was offered in 1870 to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a relative of Wilhelm I. France protested vigorously; the candidacy was withdrawn, but French Foreign Minister Antoine de Gramont demanded a public guarantee from Wilhelm I that the candidacy would never be renewed. Wilhelm refused politely; Bismarck edited the telegraphic report of the meeting (the Ems Dispatch) to make Wilhelm's refusal sound more abrupt and provocative. France declared war on 19 July 1870. The Prussian-led North German forces (joined by the South German states) defeated the French armies in a sequence of battles in August 1870, captured Napoleon III at Sedan on 1 September 1870, and besieged Paris from 19 September. The Second French Empire collapsed; the Third French Republic was proclaimed on 4 September 1870. Paris surrendered on 28 January 1871. The German Empire was proclaimed at the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on 18 January 1871, with Wilhelm I as German Emperor and Bismarck as Chancellor. The Treaty of Frankfurt (May 1871) transferred Alsace and most of Lorraine from France to the new German Empire and imposed an indemnity of five billion francs — territorial and financial losses that French opinion never accepted, producing the persistent Franco-German antagonism of the next four decades.

The post-1871 alliance system. KC-3.4.III.C: after 1871, Bismarck attempted to maintain the European balance of power through a complex alliance system aimed at isolating France. The system had four principal components.

The Three Emperors' League (Dreikaiserbund), signed in October 1873 by the Russian Tsar Alexander II, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, and the German Kaiser Wilhelm I, committed the three monarchies to consult on threats to peace and to oppose the spread of revolutionary movements. The League was renewed and updated in 1881. It worked imperfectly because Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans were fundamentally opposed.

The Dual Alliance, signed October 1879 between Germany and Austria-Hungary, provided for mutual defense if either were attacked by Russia. The treaty was provoked by Russian dissatisfaction with Bismarck's handling of the 1878 Congress of Berlin (which had reduced Russian gains from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 in deference to British and Austrian concerns). The Dual Alliance was renewed at intervals and remained in force through 1918.

The Triple Alliance, signed May 1882, added Italy to the Dual Alliance. Italy's principal motive was anger at France's 1881 establishment of a protectorate over Tunisia, which Italy had sought for itself. The Triple Alliance was renewed at five-yearly intervals through 1912. Italian commitment to it was always weaker than German or Austrian; Italy entered the First World War in May 1915 on the Allied side rather than supporting its nominal Triple Alliance partners.

The Reinsurance Treaty, signed June 1887 between Germany and Russia, was Bismarck's mechanism for keeping Russia diplomatically reassured despite the Dual Alliance with Austria. The treaty committed each power to neutrality if the other were attacked, with exceptions if Germany attacked France or if Russia attacked Austria. The treaty was secret and was kept secret even from Austria and Italy. It expired in 1890 and Wilhelm II's new government refused to renew it — the principal mistake of the early Wilhelmine period and the immediate trigger for the Franco-Russian rapprochement.

The post-1890 antagonistic alliance system. KC-3.4.III.D: Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 by the new Kaiser Wilhelm II eventually produced a system of mutually antagonistic alliances and rising international tensions. Wilhelm II (1859-1941, reigned 1888-1918) was Wilhelm I's grandson; he had succeeded his short-lived father Frederick III in 1888. Wilhelm II's relationship with Bismarck had been strained from the start; a conflict over labor policy in March 1890 produced Bismarck's resignation. Wilhelm II's foreign-policy team (Chancellor Leo von Caprivi from 1890; Foreign Secretary Friedrich von Holstein) refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 on the ground that it was incompatible with the Dual Alliance.

The Russian response was rapid. France, isolated since 1871, had been seeking a Russian alliance for years; the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty removed the principal diplomatic obstacle. Russia and France signed a military convention in August 1892 and a formal alliance in January 1894. The Franco-Russian Alliance fundamentally altered the European diplomatic landscape: Germany now faced potential war on two fronts. The German General Staff's response, the 1905 Schlieffen Plan, contemplated a rapid initial defeat of France through Belgium followed by transfer of forces eastward against Russia — the plan that produced the German violation of Belgian neutrality in August 1914.

British alignment shifted gradually. Britain had pursued "splendid isolation" through most of the late nineteenth century, with no formal continental commitments. Concerns about German naval expansion (the German High Seas Fleet program from 1898 under Admiral Tirpitz; the Anglo-German naval arms race) and shared concerns with France over German continental ambitions produced the 1904 Entente Cordiale, settling Anglo-French colonial disputes. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention extended the alignment to Russia. The Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia faced the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Italian commitment was weak; the practical alignment was Britain-France-Russia versus Germany-Austria-Hungary.

The Balkan crises and the road to war. KC-3.4.III.E: nationalist tensions in the Balkans drew the great powers into a series of crises that led to the First World War. The Balkans were the region of greatest tension because Ottoman decline produced a power vacuum that competing Balkan nationalisms (Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Albanian) and competing great-power ambitions (Russian Pan-Slavist sympathy, Austrian fear of Slavic nationalism, German support for Austria) all sought to fill.

The 1908 Bosnian Crisis began when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (which it had administered since the 1878 Congress of Berlin) without prior consultation with Russia. Russia, weakened by its 1904-1905 defeat by Japan and the 1905 Revolution, was unable to respond effectively but accepted the annexation only under German pressure. The crisis embittered Russian-Austrian relations and produced Russian determination to support Serbia, the principal regional Slavic state. The Bulgarian declaration of full independence from Ottoman suzerainty (October 1908) accompanied the Bosnian annexation.

The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) further destabilized the region. The First Balkan War (October 1912 to May 1913) saw the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro) defeat the Ottoman Empire and largely expel Ottoman forces from Europe. The Second Balkan War (June-August 1913) saw Bulgaria attack its former allies over the division of spoils, lose, and surrender most of its earlier gains. Serbia emerged substantially enlarged and self-confident; Austria-Hungary increasingly viewed Serbian success as an existential threat to Habsburg control of the southern Slavic lands.

The July Crisis of 1914 brought the system to war. On 28 June 1914, the Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, at Sarajevo. Austria-Hungary, with German backing (the "blank check" of 5-6 July), issued an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July with terms designed to be unacceptable. Serbia accepted most of the terms; Austria declared war on 28 July. Russian general mobilization (30 July) triggered German mobilization, French mobilization, and the German invasion of Belgium and France in early August. By 4 August, the principal European powers were at war.

Primary Source Excerpts

Three sources framing Italian and German unification and the post-1871 diplomatic order: Cavour's letter on the Plombieres meeting, Bismarck's account of the Ems Dispatch, and the Triple Alliance treaty text.

Letter Internet History Sourcebooks 1858

Camillo Cavour, Letter to King Victor Emmanuel II on the Plombieres Meeting, 24 July 1858

"Sire, the Emperor and I have agreed in principle on the following points: France will join Piedmont in war against Austria if a casus belli of an unmistakably Italian-national character can be arranged; the territorial settlement following our victory will give Lombardy and Venetia to Piedmont, with the establishment of an Italian confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope; in compensation for French military assistance, Piedmont will cede to France the territories of Nice and Savoy. The Emperor stipulated that the war must appear to be one of Italian liberation, not of French aggression, and that the casus belli must be supplied by Austria. The success of our undertaking will require careful diplomatic preparation."

Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour (1810-1861) met Napoleon III secretly at the spa town of Plombieres-les-Bains in the Vosges from 20-21 July 1858. The meeting produced the secret agreement that would shape Italian unification: French military assistance against Austria in exchange for Piedmontese cession of Nice and Savoy. Cavour reported the substance of the meeting to King Victor Emmanuel II in this letter (the original is in the Italian state archives in Rome). The letter illustrates the practice of diplomatic Realpolitik that KC-3.4.III.A names: skillful manipulation of great-power interests to advance Piedmontese national-political aims. For Topic 7.3 the source documents the diplomatic foundation of the 1859 war against Austria. Skill 2.C in direct practice: the source's point of view (Cavour's), purpose (informing the king of secretly negotiated terms), historical situation (post-Crimean diplomacy), and audience (Victor Emmanuel II only) all shape its content significantly.

Camillo Cavour, "Letter to King Victor Emmanuel II, 24 July 1858," in Le lettere di Camillo Cavour, ed. Luigi Chiala, vol. 3 (Turin: Roux, 1884), pp. 70-77. Trans. Mack Walker. View at Internet History Sourcebooks →
Memoir Project Gutenberg 1898

Otto von Bismarck, Memoirs (Gedanken und Erinnerungen), on the Ems Dispatch, 1898

"After I had read out the concentrated edition to my two guests, Moltke remarked: 'Now it has a different ring; before, it sounded like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge.' I went on to explain: 'If, in execution of His Majesty's order, I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and not only on account of its contents, but also on account of the manner of its distribution will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull.' This explanation brought about in the two generals a revulsion to a more joyous mood."

Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) wrote his political memoirs (Gedanken und Erinnerungen, "Thoughts and Memories") in retirement after his 1890 dismissal; they were published posthumously beginning in 1898. The excerpt describes Bismarck's editing of the telegraphic report from Bad Ems on 13 July 1870 of King Wilhelm I's conversation with the French ambassador Vincent Benedetti, who had pressed Wilhelm to provide a public guarantee that the Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne would never be renewed. Wilhelm had refused politely; Bismarck shortened and sharpened the report (without altering its substance) and released it to the press. The published version was perceived as an insult both in Berlin and in Paris; Bismarck calculated correctly that France would declare war on the strength of the perceived insult. France did so on 19 July 1870. The episode is the canonical example of Bismarckian Realpolitik manipulation of public communication for diplomatic ends. For Topic 7.3 the source illustrates KC-3.4.III.B's "manipulation of democratic mechanisms" element. Skill 2.C: the memoir's point of view (Bismarck's, retrospective and self-justifying), purpose (defending Bismarck's reputation in retirement), and audience (the German educated public after Wilhelm II's dismissal of Bismarck) all shape its content.

Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, Being the Reflections and Reminiscences, trans. A. J. Butler, vol. 2 (London: Smith, Elder, 1898), pp. 100-103. Project Gutenberg edition. View at Project Gutenberg →
Treaty Internet History Sourcebooks 1882

The Triple Alliance Treaty, Articles I-IV, Vienna, 20 May 1882

"Article I. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of their states. Article II. In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked. Article III. If one, or two, of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should chance to be attacked and to be engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers non-signatory to the present Treaty, the casus foederis will arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties. Article IV. In case a Great Power non-signatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality."

The Triple Alliance treaty was signed in Vienna on 20 May 1882 between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. It built on the 1879 Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary and added Italy after Italy's anger at the 1881 French establishment of a protectorate over Tunisia. The treaty was renewed at five-yearly intervals through 1912. Article II's specific protection against French attack reflected Italy's principal concern. Article III's broader mutual-defense clause was the principal Bismarckian provision. The treaty was secret in its specific text (only its general existence was publicly acknowledged), which complicated all subsequent European diplomatic calculations. For Topic 7.3 the source documents the central component of the post-1871 Bismarckian alliance system that KC-3.4.III.C names. Skill 2.C: the treaty's point of view (the three signatory governments), purpose (mutual defense and the diplomatic isolation of France), historical situation (post-1881 Franco-Italian rivalry over Tunisia), and audience (only the three signatory governments and their diplomatic services) all shape its content.

"Treaty of the Triple Alliance, 20 May 1882," in Alfred Francis Pribram, ed., The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920), pp. 64-73. View at Internet History Sourcebooks →

Discussion Questions

  1. (Causation, Skill 2.C) Account for the conditions that produced Italian and German unification. How did the Crimean War's weakening of the Concert of Europe make both unifications possible?
  2. (Causation, Skill 2.C) Read the Cavour letter on the Plombieres meeting. What is its point of view, purpose, historical situation, and audience? How does Cavour's diplomatic-Realpolitik approach compare with Garibaldi's popular-military approach?
  3. (Causation, Skill 2.C) Read the Bismarck memoir on the Ems Dispatch. What is its point of view, purpose, historical situation, and audience? Why does this affect how we read Bismarck's account of the episode?
  4. (Causation) Account for KC-3.4.III.C: how did Bismarck's post-1871 alliance system attempt to maintain the European balance of power and isolate France? Identify the principal components.
  5. (Causation) Account for KC-3.4.III.D and KC-3.4.III.E: how did the post-1890 antagonistic alliance system emerge, and how did Balkan crises eventually trigger the First World War in 1914?

Classroom Activities

25 min

Italian Unification Three-Phase Timeline

Distribute a timeline running 1858-1870. In small groups, students mark the principal events of Italian unification's three phases: Phase 1 (1858-1859) — Plombieres meeting (July 1858), 1859 war against Austria, battles at Magenta and Solferino, Villafranca armistice, Lombardy ceded to Piedmont. Phase 2 (1860) — central Italian plebiscites, Garibaldi's Expedition of the Thousand, the Teano meeting (October 1860), proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy (March 1861). Phase 3 (1861-1870) — Venice (1866 from the Austro-Prussian War), Rome (1870 from the Franco-Prussian War). KC-3.4.III.A becomes chronologically concrete.

20 min

German Unification Three-Wars Workshop

Distribute a comparison sheet for the three wars of German unification: 1864 Danish War, 1866 Austro-Prussian War, 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War. In small groups, students identify each war's casus belli, principal battles, peace terms, and political outcome. The activity makes Bismarck's Realpolitik strategy concrete: each war was carefully prepared diplomatically (Bismarck arranged Russian neutrality in 1864 and 1866, French neutrality in 1866, Austrian neutrality in 1870), each was won decisively, and each peace settlement was calibrated to leave the defeated party either neutralized or available as a future ally.

15 min

Three Diplomatic Sources Side-by-Side

Distribute the Cavour, Bismarck, and Triple Alliance excerpts. In pairs, students complete a Skill 2.C analysis for each: point of view, purpose, historical situation, audience. Pairs note that Cavour's letter is contemporary private correspondence, Bismarck's memoir is retrospective public self-justification, and the Triple Alliance treaty is contemporary secret diplomatic agreement. Each shapes our reading of the events differently.

20 min

Alliance System Map (1882 vs 1907)

Distribute two blank European maps. In pairs, students mark the 1882 Triple Alliance (Germany-Austria-Hungary-Italy plus the Three Emperors' League's loose Russo-Austro-German consultation; France and Britain isolated). Then mark the 1907 Triple Entente (Britain-France-Russia) versus Triple Alliance (Germany-Austria-Hungary, with Italy in name only). The contrast makes KC-3.4.III.C and KC-3.4.III.D visually concrete and shows how Bismarck's post-1871 system was inverted within twenty years of his dismissal.

Vocabulary

War between Russia on one side and Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and (from 1855) Piedmont-Sardinia on the other. Triggered by Russian pressure on the Ottoman Empire over the protection of Orthodox Christians; deeper issue was the management of Ottoman decline. Russia's defeat ended its post-1815 role as the gendarme of European conservatism and opened the way for Italian and German unification.
Secret meeting on 20-21 July 1858 between Cavour and Napoleon III at the spa town of Plombieres-les-Bains in the Vosges. Produced the agreement for French military assistance against Austria in exchange for Piedmontese cession of Nice and Savoy. The diplomatic foundation of the 1859 Italian War of Independence.
Piedmontese statesman (1810-1861), Prime Minister of Piedmont-Sardinia 1852-1859 and 1860-1861. Principal architect of Italian unification. Combined economic modernization, parliamentary reform, and skillful diplomacy with Napoleon III. Died three months after the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in March 1861.
Italian republican-nationalist soldier (1807-1882). Led the Expedition of the Thousand (May-October 1860) from Genoa to Sicily and then to Naples, defeating Bourbon-Sicilian forces and presenting his conquests to King Victor Emmanuel II at Teano. The principal popular hero of Italian unification.
Garibaldi's May 1860 expedition with one thousand red-shirted volunteers from Genoa to Sicily to support a popular revolt against Bourbon-Sicilian rule. Defeated the Bourbon army at Calatafimi (15 May), captured Palermo (27 May), crossed to the Italian mainland, and entered Naples on 7 September 1860. The principal popular phase of Italian unification.
3 July 1866 battle in Bohemia in which the Prussian army under Helmuth von Moltke decisively defeated the Austrian army of Field Marshal Ludwig von Benedek. The decisive battle of the Austro-Prussian War. Ended Austrian leadership of the German world and produced the North German Confederation under Prussian leadership.
Telegraphic report of King Wilhelm I's 13 July 1870 conversation with the French ambassador Vincent Benedetti at Bad Ems. Bismarck edited the report to make Wilhelm's polite refusal of French demands sound more abrupt and provocative. The published version produced French outrage and the French declaration of war on 19 July 1870. Canonical example of Bismarckian Realpolitik manipulation of public communication.
1 September 1870 battle in northern France in which the Prussian-led North German forces decisively defeated the French Army of Chalons under Marshal MacMahon and captured Emperor Napoleon III. The decisive battle of the Franco-Prussian War. Brought down the Second French Empire (Third Republic proclaimed 4 September) and produced the political pressure for the proclamation of the German Empire.
18 January 1871 proclamation of the German Empire at the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, with Wilhelm I as German Emperor and Bismarck as Imperial Chancellor. The deliberate choice of Versailles (the captured French royal palace) as the venue intensified French resentment at German victory and contributed to the durable Franco-German antagonism of the next four decades.
October 1879 defensive alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Provided for mutual defense if either were attacked by Russia. Provoked by Russian dissatisfaction with the 1878 Congress of Berlin. Renewed at intervals; remained in force through 1918.
May 1882 defensive alliance among Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Italy joined principally because of anger at the 1881 French establishment of a protectorate over Tunisia. Renewed at five-yearly intervals through 1912. Italian commitment was always weak; Italy entered the First World War in 1915 on the Allied side rather than supporting its nominal Triple Alliance partners.
Secret treaty between Germany and Russia, signed June 1887. Each power committed to neutrality if the other were attacked, with exceptions for German attack on France or Russian attack on Austria. Wilhelm II's government refused to renew the treaty in 1890; the principal mistake of the early Wilhelmine period and the immediate trigger for the Franco-Russian rapprochement.
The diplomatic alignment of Britain, France, and Russia formed through the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance, the 1904 Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, and the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. Faced the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) in 1914. Italian commitment to the Triple Alliance was weak; the practical alignment was Britain-France-Russia versus Germany-Austria-Hungary.
Diplomatic crisis triggered by Austria-Hungary's October 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which it had administered since the 1878 Congress of Berlin). Russia, weakened by its 1904-1905 defeat by Japan, accepted the annexation under German pressure. The crisis embittered Russian-Austrian relations and produced Russian determination to support Serbia.
Two related wars destabilizing the Balkans. The First Balkan War (October 1912 to May 1913) saw the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro) defeat the Ottoman Empire and largely expel Ottoman forces from Europe. The Second Balkan War (June-August 1913) saw Bulgaria attack its former allies over the division of spoils, lose, and surrender most of its earlier gains. Serbia emerged substantially enlarged; Austrian fear of Serbia intensified.

Standards Alignment

Draft alignment — pending educator review. AP European History codes correspond to the official College Board Course and Exam Description (Effective Fall 2023, V.1). Statements below are paraphrased in the CountryReports voice; refer to the College Board's published CED for verbatim wording.

AP European History CED-ALIGNED

Themes (Dual)

NEINational and European Identity — Italian and German unification as the principal nineteenth-century European national-state-formation projects.
SOPStates and Other Institutions of Power — the post-1871 alliance system, its post-1890 breakdown, and the Balkan crises that produced the First World War.

Historical Thinking Skill and Reasoning Process

Skill 2.CExplain the significance of a source's point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience, including how these might limit the use(s) of a source. (Skill category 2: Sourcing and Situation.)
Reasoning 2Causation — describe causes and effects of historical events, developments, or processes.

Learning Objectives (Dual)

LO 7.CIdentify the conditions that produced Italian unification and German unification.
LO 7.DAccount for how nationalist sentiment and political alliances generated tension among European powers between 1815 and 1914.

Key Concepts

KC-3.4.II.AThe Crimean War exposed the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and contributed to the breakdown of the Concert of Europe, creating the conditions in which Italy and Germany could be unified.
KC-3.4.III.ACavour's diplomacy, combined with Garibaldi's popular military campaigns, produced the unification of Italy.
KC-3.4.III.BBismarck used Realpolitik — diplomacy, industrialized warfare, modern weaponry, and the manipulation of democratic mechanisms — to unify Germany.
KC-3.4.III.CAfter 1871, Bismarck attempted to maintain the European balance of power through a complex system of alliances aimed at isolating France.
KC-3.4.III.DBismarck's dismissal in 1890 eventually produced a system of mutually antagonistic alliances and rising international tensions.
KC-3.4.III.ENationalist tensions in the Balkans drew the great powers into a series of crises that led to the First World War.
National Cross-Walks
NCSS Theme 6Power, Authority, and Governance — the late-nineteenth-century reshaping of the European balance of power through Italian and German unification and the post-1871 alliance system.
NCSS Theme 9Global Connections — the post-1871 European diplomatic system as the principal great-power coordination mechanism between the Vienna settlement and the First World War.
C3 D2.His.5.9-12Analyze how historical contexts shaped and continue to shape people's perspectives.
C3 D2.His.10.9-12Detect possible limitations in various kinds of historical evidence and differing secondary interpretations.
CCSS RH.11-12.6Evaluate authors' differing points of view on the same historical event or issue by assessing the authors' claims, reasoning, and evidence.
Discipline-Specific National Standards
NSH Era 7 · Std 12Examine the unification of Italy (1859-1870) under Cavour's diplomacy and Garibaldi's military campaigns and the unification of Germany (1864-1871) under Bismarck's Realpolitik through three wars.
NSH Era 7 · Std 12AExamine the post-1871 European diplomatic order: the Bismarckian alliance system (Three Emperors' League, Dual Alliance, Triple Alliance, Reinsurance Treaty), the post-1890 antagonistic alliances (Franco-Russian Alliance, Entente Cordiale, Triple Entente), and the Balkan crises that produced the First World War.
Other Assessment Frameworks
AP US HistoryCross-reference Period 5 (1844-1877) and Period 6 (1865-1898) — the parallel American national-consolidation project (the Civil War of 1861-1865 and Reconstruction); the contrast between American Civil War-era nationalism and contemporaneous European unification movements.
AP World HistoryCross-reference Unit 7 (Global Conflict) — the European post-1871 diplomatic system in comparative perspective with the contemporaneous Meiji Japanese state-building, the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms, and the late-Russian state modernization.
AP Comparative GovernmentCross-reference foundational concepts — comparative analysis of national-unification processes; the historical relationship between dynastic conservatism and nationalist mobilization (the Cavour-Bismarck pattern); the long-run consequences of secret treaty diplomacy for international stability.

AP Practice Questions

Multiple Choice Sample ~ 2 min
1Question: Which of the following best describes the central pattern of Italian and German unification?
  • (A) Both unifications were achieved through pure popular insurrection without diplomatic preparation or great-power involvement.
  • (B) Italian unification combined Cavour's diplomacy with Garibaldi's military campaigns; German unification proceeded through Bismarck's Realpolitik strategy of three carefully prepared wars (KC-3.4.III.A, KC-3.4.III.B).
  • (C) Both unifications occurred in 1815 as part of the Vienna settlement.
  • (D) Both unifications produced parliamentary republics rather than constitutional monarchies.
  • (E) Both unifications were imposed by external great-power intervention without any domestic political support.

Correct: (B). KC-3.4.III.A and KC-3.4.III.B together describe the dual pattern. (A) ignores the documented diplomatic and great-power involvement (Cavour's Plombieres meeting with Napoleon III; Bismarck's diplomatic preparation of each war). (C) misstates the chronology by half a century. (D) is contradicted by the actual outcomes: both produced constitutional monarchies (the House of Savoy in Italy, the Hohenzollerns in Germany). (E) misstates the role of domestic political support: both unifications had substantial domestic mobilization (popular plebiscites in Italy; the manipulation of mass-democratic mechanisms in Germany). (LO C; Skill 2.C; Reasoning Process: Causation).

Short Answer Question ~ 12 min · 1 page
2Question: Using your knowledge of European history between roughly 1853 and 1914, answer all three parts that follow.
  1. Identify ONE specific way that the Crimean War (1853-1856) contributed to the conditions in which Italy and Germany could be unified.
  2. Explain ONE specific element of Bismarck's post-1871 alliance system that aimed to isolate France.
  3. Explain ONE specific Balkan crisis between 1908 and 1914 that contributed to the outbreak of the First World War.

Scoring: 1 point for each part. Strong responses to part (a) might cite the Russian defeat ending Russia's role as the gendarme of European conservatism (KC-3.4.II.A); the demilitarization of the Black Sea in the 1856 Treaty of Paris reducing Russian capacity to oppose Italian or German unification; Cavour's small Piedmontese contribution to the war giving Piedmont-Sardinia a seat at the Paris peace conference and the diplomatic standing to pursue Italian unification with French support; or Napoleon III's assertive post-Crimean foreign policy producing the 1858 Plombieres meeting with Cavour. Part (b) responses might cite the Three Emperors' League (1873, renewed 1881) committing Russia, Austria, and Germany to consult on threats to peace; the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary (1879) providing for mutual defense if either were attacked by Russia; the Triple Alliance (1882) adding Italy; the Reinsurance Treaty (1887) keeping Russia diplomatically reassured despite the Dual Alliance with Austria; or Bismarck's general policy of supporting Russian and Austrian Balkan interests against each other to keep both dependent on German mediation (KC-3.4.III.C). Part (c) responses might cite the 1908 Bosnian Crisis (Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Russian forced acquiescence under German pressure; embittered Russian-Austrian relations); the First Balkan War of 1912-1913 (defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the Balkan League; expulsion of Ottoman forces from Europe); the Second Balkan War of 1913 (Bulgaria's defeat by its former allies; substantial enlargement of Serbia); or the July Crisis of 1914 itself (the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914; Austrian ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July; Russian mobilization on 30 July; German invasion of Belgium and France in early August) (KC-3.4.III.E).

Document-Based Question Stem ~ 60 min · 7 documents
3Prompt: Account for the conditions that produced the late-nineteenth-century reshaping of the European balance of power through Italian and German unification and the post-1871 alliance system. In your response, draw evidence from the seven documents and from your own knowledge of the period.

The full seven-document set for this DBQ lives in the Unit 7 practice exam packet (Document A: Treaty of Paris, 1856; Document B: Cavour, Plombieres letter, 1858; Document C: Mazzini, Italy and the Republic, 1849; Document D: Bismarck, Blood and Iron Speech, 1862; Document E: Triple Alliance Treaty, 1882; Document F: Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, 1904; Document G: Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, 1914).

Scoring framework: 1 point thesis, 1 point contextualization, up to 4 points evidence (at least 3 documents used to support the argument, plus an outside-evidence point), 1 point sourcing (point of view, purpose, situation, audience for at least three documents), 1 point complexity. Maximum 7 points. The default reasoning process is Causation; strong responses identify the principal causal mechanisms (the Crimean War weakening the Concert of Europe; the Cavour-Bismarck Realpolitik approach to national unification; the post-1871 Bismarckian alliance system aimed at isolating France; the post-1890 inversion of the system into antagonistic blocks) and trace the chain through specific historical events. Acknowledging that the post-1871 European diplomatic system was both more complex and more fragile than its Bismarckian designers intended — that secret treaties and competing nationalisms produced the cascading 1914 crisis from a relatively local Balkan trigger — earns the complexity point.

Long Essay Question Stem ~ 40 min
4Prompt: Compare the unification of Italy with the unification of Germany. Account for the principal similarities and differences in the two processes. Defend a clear claim with specific historical evidence.

Scoring framework: 1 point thesis, 1 point contextualization, 2 points evidence (at least two pieces of specific historical evidence, one of which directly supports the argument), 1 point analysis using the Causation reasoning process, 1 point complexity. Maximum 6 points. The complexity point is most often earned by integrating the similarities (both unifications proceeded under conservative monarchical leadership; both required diplomatic isolation of Austria; both relied on Realpolitik; both produced constitutional monarchies rather than republics) with the differences (Italian unification combined Cavour's diplomacy with Garibaldi's popular military campaigns, while German unification was almost entirely a state-led project; Italian unification took longer and remained partially incomplete on Italian-irredentist grounds; German unification produced a much more powerful state). Strong responses cite specific dates, individuals, and events from both cases rather than treating "Italian unification" and "German unification" as undifferentiated wholes.